Animal Cruelty

Animal cruelty has been illegal for a long time in all fifty states of America. In 1999, Congress made it a federal crime to sell or create images of animal cruelty (except those with scientific, journalistic, religious or political value) with foreign or commercial gain as the objective. The original target of this law was the depiction of crush or fetish videos. “Crush videos,” or videos in which animals are shown being crushed by the feet of high-heeled or bare-footed women, were made for a specific audience with a fetish for these actions.

Though in United States v. Stevens, crush videos were not a factor, First Amendment concerns were an issue. In 18 U.S.C. Section 48, the law covers animal cruelty depictions as long as the behavior is illegal in the state where the creation or sale of cruelty occurs. In United States v. Stevens, Robert Stevens was convicted for intentionally selling depictions of animal cruelty, namely, organized pit-bull dogfights and hunting expeditions. Though Stevens was not a part of the actual filming, he was responsible for editing the tapes and added his own narration to the films as well. The US Supreme Court overturned his conviction, arguing that it was unconstitutional and had no compelling interests in regards to free speech.

Congress grounded some of their defenses of the depictions of animal cruelty in the case of New York v. Ferber, where it was made illegal to create, sell or possess child pornography. However, the ruling in Ferber does not make a clear and concise connection with the new statute with animal cruelty. As mentioned earlier, there was simply no compelling evidence to gain governmental interest. Another court cased that was frequently used was the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which tested the value of the speech and whether it was worthwhile or worthless. This case created a new category of speech that would not be protected under the First Amendment. Zechariah Chafee recognized two types of expression that were identified within Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that separated the individual’s interest from a general social interest (page 435, Tedford & Herbeck). He defined these two categories as “(1) That which has social value as a step to truth; and (2) That which has no social value as a step to truth” (page 170, Tedford & Herbeck). This two-level system of free speech is what distinguishes an expression from being worthwhile or worthless.

However, I believe that the philosophy of John Stuart Mill rightly and directly applies to the animal cruelty case. Mill would suggest that individuals have the right to act as they want, as long as they do not harm others. In United States v. Stevens, this man did not directly harm anyone through his “actions” of narrating and editing scenes of a film. Had he been a participant in the actual recording or acting in the film, it would have been a different matter, but that is not the case. I do recognize, however, especially after reading and watching materials online related to this case, that there was harm done to the animals. But this does not move me to overturn the law because Stevens was not directly involved with the harming of animals. Another reason why I would still protect him, and perhaps the film, is because it was filmed in Japan, where these acts are legal. If the film were made in the United States illegally, then this would have been a different case and I would have different opinions on that matter, however, the fact is that the films were made in Japan where dogfighting is legal.

Also, C. Edwin Baker’s liberty theory supports the rights of the individual and states that free speech is a liberty that should not be defined by government. His model protects speech unless it is violent or causes actual harm, or that which constitutes fraud, perjury, blackmail, espionage, or treason (page 442, Tedford & Herbeck). In relation to Stevens’ case, he was not directly involved in any acts of violence, which then moves me to protect his rights because he was not harming anyone by narrating a couple of films. In conclusion, I believe that Stevens should be protected for merely narrating a film that he did not actually create. Though there are clearly acts of violence within his film, he was not a part of the making of that aspect, which I also believe he was punished too harshly for.

In a NY Times article, a subtle similarity was drawn between child pornography and the animal cruelty case in that the SLAPs clause was applied to the law. As mentioned earlier, religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical or artistic value served as exceptions in these types of cases. Personally, it is difficult for me to directly apply this to the case of animal cruelty and “crush videos” because it sounds a bit strange that we would be protecting odd fetishes of individuals. Regardless, I still stand by Stevens in protecting him for distributing and selling the animal-fighting videos because it did not immediately incite harm or violence to the public. If I were to apply the SLAPs value in animal cruelty cases, I would say that it would have to be done on a case-by-case basis.

Congress created a law that is too overly broad, creating a new category of unprotected speech that limits the liberty of certain individuals, such as Stevens, who did not directly commit an actual crime. Though I do not think that there is a need to create a whole new category of unprotected speech that was exemplified in Ferber’s case, I would apply Mill’s harm theory to protect Stevens.